Difference between revisions of "The core developers of a dao"

From Fintech Lab Wiki
 
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== Definition ==
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== Role and activity ==
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The core developers are in charge of developing the software that is, for all intents and purposes, the skeleton on which the [[DAOs: essential legal issues|decentralized autonomous organization]] operates, and they define, together with the [[THE FOUNDERS OF A DAO|founders]] of the organization, the rules referred to in the whitepaper, which can basically be traced back to the [[SMART CONTRACT AND ESSENTIAL LEGAL ISSUES|smart contract]].  
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Those known as the "developers" of a [[Decentralized Autonomous Organization|Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO)]] are in charge of "''creating, deploying, and developing the DAO white paper rules in a [[Smart Contracts and DeFi|smart contract]] encoded on blockchain protocol''"<ref>C. Santana, L. Albareda, ''Blockchain and the emergence of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs): An integrative model and research agenda'', in ''Technological Forecasting & Social Change'', 2022, p. 5.</ref>.  
  
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In other words, the members of the core developing team are the only ones who hold the key to being able to modify the code. In this sense, each line of code constitutes to all intents and purposes, on the one hand, a strategic or managerial choice of the organization, involving the entire blockchain and, therefore, all participants in the network, and on the other hand, a technical choice that is functional to reflect the defined objectives.
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"''While anyone may make proposals for updating the code''", only the members of the "core developing team" hold the "''commit key''" (the password that allows changes to be made to the blockchain's software repository) to being able to modify it<ref name=":0">P. Hacker, ''Corporate Governance for Complex Cryptocurrencies ? A framework for Stability and Decision Making in Blockchain-Based Organizations'', 22 Nov 2017, p. 11.</ref>. In this sense, each line of code constitutes to all intents and purposes, on the one hand, a strategic or managerial choice of the organization, involving the entire blockchain and, therefore, all participants in the network, and on the other hand, a technical choice that is functional to reflect the defined objectives.
  
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The developers, it is pointed out, are not directly accountable to [[The token holders|token holders]].  
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The developers are not directly accountable to [[The token holders|token holders]]. In fact, "''a DAO does not necessarily have a controlling party and, therefore, allows for open access and permissionless innovation - that is, developers can experiment with new products and ideas without fearing repercussions from a central governing entity''"<ref>C. Bellavitis, C. Fisch, P. P. Mumtaz, ''The rise of decentralized autonomous organizations (DOAs): a first empirical glimpse'', June 7, 2022, p. 9.</ref>.  
  
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In most cases, core team members are part of the bodies of associations or [[Foundation (under Italian Civil Code)|foundations]], which are thus responsible for coordinating and promoting the network underlying the [[DAOs: essential legal issues|DAO]], while also making strategic choices.
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In most cases, the developers are members of associations or [[Foundation (under Italian Civil Code)|foundations]], which are thus responsible for coordinating and promoting the network underlying the [[DAOs: essential legal issues|DAO]], while also making strategic choices<ref>R. Piselli, ''Quando la decentralizzazione delle'' DLT ''incontra il mercato dei capitali. Appunti sulle organizzazioni decentralizzate'', in ''AGE'', 2019, p. 386.</ref>.
  
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== References ==
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Moreover, they do "''often coordinate their actions with operators of large [[The miners|mining pools]]''"<ref name=":0" />.
  
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* P. Hacker, ''Corporate Governance for Complex Cryptocurrencies ? A framework for Stability and Decision Making in Blockchain-Based Organizations'', 22 Nov 2017, p. 11, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2998830
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==References==
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* R. Piselli, ''Quando la decentralizzazione delle'' DLT ''incontra il mercato dei capitali. Appunti sulle organizzazioni decentralizzate'', in ''AGE'', 2019, p. 386.
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* C. Santana, L. Albareda, ''Blockchain and the emergence of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs): An integrative model and research agenda'', in ''Technological Forecasting & Social Change'', 2022, p. 5.
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*P. Hacker, ''Corporate Governance for Complex Cryptocurrencies ? A framework for Stability and Decision Making in Blockchain-Based Organizations'', 22 Nov 2017, p. 11, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2998830
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*R. Piselli, ''Quando la decentralizzazione delle'' DLT ''incontra il mercato dei capitali. Appunti sulle organizzazioni decentralizzate'', in ''AGE'', 2019, p. 386.
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*C. Santana, L. Albareda, ''Blockchain and the emergence of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs): An integrative model and research agenda'', in ''Technological Forecasting & Social Change'', 2022, p. 5.
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*C. Bellavitis, C. Fisch, P. P. Mumtaz, ''The rise of decentralized autonomous organizations (DOAs): a first empirical glimpse'', June 7, 2022, p. 9.
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*A. Walch, ''Deconstructing "Decentralization": Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems'', in ''Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives'' (Chris Brummer, ed.), Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 52.
  
 
[[Category:MUSA Tech4Fin Milestone 1]]
 
[[Category:MUSA Tech4Fin Milestone 1]]
 
[[Category:MUSA DOLaw]]
 
[[Category:MUSA DOLaw]]

Latest revision as of 08:37, 29 September 2023

Role and activity

Those known as the "developers" of a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) are in charge of "creating, deploying, and developing the DAO white paper rules in a smart contract encoded on blockchain protocol"[1].

"While anyone may make proposals for updating the code", only the members of the "core developing team" hold the "commit key" (the password that allows changes to be made to the blockchain's software repository) to being able to modify it[2]. In this sense, each line of code constitutes to all intents and purposes, on the one hand, a strategic or managerial choice of the organization, involving the entire blockchain and, therefore, all participants in the network, and on the other hand, a technical choice that is functional to reflect the defined objectives.

The developers are not directly accountable to token holders. In fact, "a DAO does not necessarily have a controlling party and, therefore, allows for open access and permissionless innovation - that is, developers can experiment with new products and ideas without fearing repercussions from a central governing entity"[3].

In most cases, the developers are members of associations or foundations, which are thus responsible for coordinating and promoting the network underlying the DAO, while also making strategic choices[4].

Moreover, they do "often coordinate their actions with operators of large mining pools"[2].

References

  • P. Hacker, Corporate Governance for Complex Cryptocurrencies ? A framework for Stability and Decision Making in Blockchain-Based Organizations, 22 Nov 2017, p. 11, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2998830
  • R. Piselli, Quando la decentralizzazione delle DLT incontra il mercato dei capitali. Appunti sulle organizzazioni decentralizzate, in AGE, 2019, p. 386.
  • C. Santana, L. Albareda, Blockchain and the emergence of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs): An integrative model and research agenda, in Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 2022, p. 5.
  • C. Bellavitis, C. Fisch, P. P. Mumtaz, The rise of decentralized autonomous organizations (DOAs): a first empirical glimpse, June 7, 2022, p. 9.
  • A. Walch, Deconstructing "Decentralization": Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems, in Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives (Chris Brummer, ed.), Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 52.
  1. ↑ C. Santana, L. Albareda, Blockchain and the emergence of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs): An integrative model and research agenda, in Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 2022, p. 5.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 P. Hacker, Corporate Governance for Complex Cryptocurrencies ? A framework for Stability and Decision Making in Blockchain-Based Organizations, 22 Nov 2017, p. 11.
  3. ↑ C. Bellavitis, C. Fisch, P. P. Mumtaz, The rise of decentralized autonomous organizations (DOAs): a first empirical glimpse, June 7, 2022, p. 9.
  4. ↑ R. Piselli, Quando la decentralizzazione delle DLT incontra il mercato dei capitali. Appunti sulle organizzazioni decentralizzate, in AGE, 2019, p. 386.
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